Trump’s impact on Japan and Asean

Since the second Trump administration was inaugurated, the world has looked with a mix of hope and fear, because American domestic and foreign policy has left the long standards. President Donald Trump’s claim that the US has supported an excessive burden, along with requirements for larger contributions from Europe, Japan and other alliances, and even comments that undermine the alliances themselves, shaken the unit that was carefully sought by the Biden government. With his deep distrust of international institutions, Trump has already signed an executive order that the US withdrew from the UN Commission for Human Rights. In the meantime, the dismantling of USAID has sent shock waves through auxiliary sectors around the world.

For Asia, the most important revelation is the rejection by Trump of economic globalism and his clear tendency to protectionism. Rates are often considered a form of “transactional” diplomacy: high rates can be threatened occasionally, but provided that the requirements are paid, they are ultimately not implemented. Trump sent shock waves all over the world by announcing – and then suspending – what he called ‘mutual rates’, which were in fact calculated on the basis of American trade shortages with his individual trading partners. In minutes, Trump had fragmented the free and open economic order by the GATT/WTO system. These abrupt shifts in US economic policy have expressed serious concern in East Asia and the regional industry, which depends on supply chains built on open cross-border activities.

Although China has achieved fast profits, the US remains the world’s leading super power. In the future, however, it is clear that the US will pursue its own interests instead of being the primary pillar of the global order, as it was during the entire after-cold war period. It should be noted that this shift to the kind of behavior that was historically more usually associated with big forces, did not start with the Trump government, but is in fact a long -term trend. Nevertheless, Trump’s policy in particular has increased the alliant networks, international institutions, the economy and universal values ​​in several areas. They also made clear how dependent Asia and the rest of the world have been to the US

With rapidly rising uncertainty within the regional order in Asia, Japan and Asean countries have to work more closely than ever before. Yet their cooperation does not change the reality that they remain highly dependent on the United States. For his part, Japan is part of an alliance and is highly dependent on the US for its own safety. Since the rise of China as a great power, Japan has performed safety cooperation with the US in a number of areas. The Philippines are also highly dependent on the US for safety, especially in comparison with other ASEAN countries. Thailand is a US Treaty, while Singapore and Malaysia have worked in informal with the US in the defense, looking for a continuous American presence in Southeast -Asia as a right to China. However, neither of the countries is just as close to the US as Japan.

There are significant differences between Japan and Southeast Asia in the field of values. Singapore’s Bilahari Kausikan, a former diplomat and well -known commentator, has argued (in Foreign AffairsFor example) that Trump’s efforts to dismantle democratic institutions in the US are not great care in Southeast -Asia, where skepticism against Western values ​​has always been present. Japan is different. Although skepticism and resistance to a Western -oriented world exist, post -war Japan has embraced the values ​​of advanced democratic countries as a model. It has achieved these values ​​to a certain extent and has built up a peaceful, democratic society. This achievement has now become part of the national identity of Japan. For many Japanese people it is difficult to turn away from what is happening in the US, which they have long seen as a model.

Tokyo must now deal with a fast -growing trade war between the US and China, together with sharp shifts in American policy. Japan is not part of a regional organization such as Asean, which acts as a buffer against external pressure and challenges. It is true that the active independent diplomacy of Asean countries, such as the accession of Indonesia to Brics, is remarkable, and this raises the question of how long ASEAN centrality can be maintained. Nevertheless, it was interesting to note that in February Malaysia, as ASEAN chairman, refers to plans for a USAAN-Top aimed at expressing regional opinions about the American tariff policy. Regardless of whether this initiative comes, ASEAN countries have at least a framework for coordinating individual opinions about external challenges and collective negotiations with external powers. This is something that Japan misses.

Although these differences acknowledge, both Japan and ASEAN have to work together to create and work a very predictable strategic environment in the region to keep the economic order as free and open as possible. This requires a versatile and advanced diplomatic approach in which partnerships with large powers, middle powers and small countries are strengthened. Now it is more than ever of vital importance that Japan and ASEAN -Landen strengthen partnerships.