The time is now for Kazakhstan to reach Russia energy independence

Since Europe moved to close its market to Russian gas After the 2022 invasion in Ukraine, the Kremlin actively searched for new export markets.

But in 2024, Gazprom – once the world’s largest energy company – Reported losses of 1,076 trillion Roebel (about $ 12.89 billion), the first net loss in almost 24 years, comes after a win of 2023 of 700 billion rubles ($ 7.51 billion). The situation for the Kremlin exacerbated When China refused to increase stocks Under the power of the Siberia 2 project, which was intended to compensate for the loss of 50 billion cubic meters of gas in Europe.

Still looking for new markets, last year Russian President Vladimir Putin reached an agreement With Uzbeek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev for the delivery of Russian gas to Uzbekistan, known as the ‘Reverse Scheme’. The export of gas from Russia to Uzbekistan reached 5.6 billion cubic meters in 2024With the objective to increase the current to a maximum of 11 billion cubic meters.

Uzbekistan, which has its own gas industry, uses Russian gas to meet its growing domestic requirements, while Tashkent can continue to export to exporting gas to China. Uzbekistan cashed in the hard currency (about $ 160 per thousand cubic meters) for export to China, while it pays a much lower price for imported Russian gas.

Because the export crisis of the gas is still acute for Russia, The Kremlin also lobbying to deliver Russian gas to Noord -KazakhstanIncluding the capital of Kazakhstan – Astana. Despite the enormous gas and oil deposits of the West Kazakhstan, the northern regions of the country are not led. The gasping of these regions, where more than 2 million ethnic Russians live, is significant geopolitical risks for Kazakhstan comparable to those in Eastern Ukraine.

It is no secret that Russia has repeatedly used gas stocks as a tool for political pressure. Currently three -quarters of the exported Kazakh oil fusses through the Russian port of Novorossiysk. The pipelines that are crucial for the export of Kazakhstan by Russia Occasionally switched offin different technical pretenses. These closures often coincide with problems in bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Russia in other areas, suggest a political motivation.

The prospect of importing Russian gas to North Kazakhstan must take into account how the country uses its own abundant means. In the oil and gas-rich west of the country, much of the gas produced is reduced to the oil reservoirs in fields such as Karachaganak, Tengiz and Kashagan. Because oil production is expected to decrease in five to seven years, it will be important for Kazakh’s government to make plans for the future use of this gas.

Increasing gas export requires pipelines. The government of Kazakhstan must therefore negotiate with Russia to relieve Moscow’s strict attitude when building an oil and gas pipeline of Kazakhstan over the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, Turkiye and then Europe. Russia and Iran have long blocked the progress on such routes to extend the export of energy from Central Azia to world markets, often used as a pretext of discussions about the definition of the Caspian Sea.

Kazakhstan can currently supply oil and gas to German refineries via the Druzhba pipeline, but that still depends on the permission of Russia. Ensuring energy security through diversification of export routes is crucial for Kazakhstan, and laying a pipeline over the bed of the Caspian Sea is essential for Kazakh energyability and political independence.

The costs for laying a gas line over the Caspian Sea can be shared with Turkmenistan, which also benefits. And the EU can be tempted to help with financing. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan together have the fourth largest gas reserves worldwide and can replace Russian or precious American liquid natural gas in Europe, and meet the needs of Europe for the next decades.

At the recent EU Central Station Asia-summit, held on 3-4 April in Samarkand, President Ursula von der Leyen of the European Commission announced plans Invest more than 12 billion euros in regional infrastructure development. At the same time, China makes significant investments in the expansion of logistics on the Kazakh coast of the Caspian Sea as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Current geopolitical circumstances, as tumultuous as they are, are nevertheless conducive to Kazakhstan to achieve energy independence from Russia.

Europe would support such a project that is given that an ever -unpredictable trade relations between Europe and the United States. The development of oil and gas deposits of China in western Kazakhstan would also prefer increasing exports, but the most important thing is the reduced geopolitical influence of Russia in the region. In 2023, Russia lost its economic hegemony to China for the first time since the Russian Empire in Central -Asia. According to data from 2024, trade volumes between Kazakhstan and China exceeded $ 40 billion compared to $ 27 billion between Kazakhstan and Russia. A similar situation can also be observed in Uzbekistan.

Nowadays, Kazakhstan has a crucial chance of diversifying his oil and gas pipelines, given the geopolitical and economic weaknesses of Russia. To maintain economic and political independence, the Kazakhstan government must act quickly by taking advantage of Russia’s own wishes to find new markets for IT gas gas. The Russian willingness to export gas to Noord -Kazakhstan should have a price – and that price should be Moscow’s approval for Kazakhstan to sell his own gas to Europe and bypass Russia.